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COMMENTS
CONSTITUTIONAL LAW-DISCRIMINATION UNDER THE
FOURTEENTH AMENDMENT-EXPANSION OF TIlE
STATE ACTION CONCEPT.
The recent sit-in demonstrations which have been waged against
private individuals and groups serve to point up an important principal
of federal constitutional law; the fourteenth amendment and statutes
enacted pursuant thereto prohibit only discrimination by a state and do
not affect the actions of individuals.' Although not the first, probably
the most famous cases to construe the fourteenth amendment in this
respect were the Civil Rights Cases,2 in which the Civil Rights Act of
1875, enacted under the enabling provision of the fourteenth amendment,
was held unconstitutional on the basis that the amendment did not confer
upon Congress plenary power to regulate the conduct of individuals. Thus
at an early date the applicability of the amendment was limited to
"state action."
The history of the state action concept is the history of a Court
reluctant to overturn settled precedent but unwilling to be fettered by
its obvious limitations. As a result the expansion of the state action con-
cept began as soon as the concept itself was formulated. In fact, even
prior to the Civil Rights Cases the United States Supreme Court had
held that acts of a state judge constituted state action under the four-
teenth amendment,3 and as early as 1880 the Court invalidated a state
statute on the basis that it constituted unlawful state action in violation
of the fourteenth amendment.4 The subsequent course of expansion in-
cludes holdings that acts of executive officers,5 acts of administrative
boards,6 acts of state officials even when in violation of state laws, 7
1. U.S. CoNsT. amend. XIV, § 1: "No State shall make or enforce any law
which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United States; nor
shall any State deprive any person of life, liberty, or property, without due process
of law; nor deny to any person within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the
laws." (Emphasis added.)
2. 109 U.S. 3 (1883).
3. Ex parte Virginia, 100 U.S. 339 (1880). See also Virginia v. Rives, 100
U.S. 313 (1880).
4. Strauder v. West Virginia, 100 U.S. 303 (1880).
5. Ex parte Young, 209 U.S. 123 (1907); Virginia v. Rives, 100 U.S. 313
(1880).
6. Raymond v. Chicago Traction Co., 207 U.S. 20 (1907).
7. Screws v. United States, 325 U.S. 91 (1945) ; Compare Raymond v. Chicago
Union Traction Co., supra note 6, with Barney v. City of New York, 193 U.S. 430
(1904).
(218)
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acts of a municipality,8 and improper enforcement of valid state laws9
all constitute state action within the meaning of the amendment.
In the above situations, where the state itself is the primary actor,
the concept of state action is more or less clearly defined. Less clear is
the penumbral area, wherein private individuals are the active discrimina-
tors. The major problem in this area is the determination of what amount
of state control or participation is necessary to render acts of private
individuals or groups state action and hence subject to the constitutional
limitations of the fourteenth amendment. The confusion and uncertainty
in this area stems mainly from the fact that the United States Supreme
Court has not spoken on much of the law of state action, and is com-
pounded by the inexact and often conflicting language which the Court
has used when it has dealt with this topic.10 The purpose of this comment
is to analyze the existing cases and to attempt to develop the criteria for
determining what acts constitute state action in this fringe area.
I.
THEORIES OF STATE ACTION
The extension of the concept has taken place by the process of
assimilation of individual action not authorized by the state but per-
formed under color of state law and of individual action which is in some
way sanctioned by the state." Thus in the areas with which we are
primarily concerned the search is not for affirmative action by the state
as such but rather for state responsibility for acts of individuals.1 2 The
connection between the state and the private party which renders the
actions of the latter state action and thereby subject to the constitutional
limitations may arise in various ways, including the following: the use
of state property, the granting of various forms of state aid and resultant
state control, or the granting by the state of special powers and privileges.
A.
State Property Theory
It seems clear that the state itself cannot use its property in a dis-
criminatory manner.'3 Thus in Henry v. Greenville Airport Comm'n the
Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit declared: "It is well settled that
8. Buchanan v. Warley,,245 U.S. 60 (1917).
9. Yick Wo v. Hopkins, 118 U.S. 356 (1886); Neal v. Delaware, 103 U.S. 370
(1880).
10. Compare the following statements, "It is state action of a particular charac-
ter that is prohibited [by the fourteenth amendment]," Civil Rights Cases, 109 U.S. 3,
11 (1883), with "State action, as that phrase is understood for the purposes of the
Fourteenth Amendment, refers to the exertion of state power in all forms." Shelley
v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 20 (1948).
11. Comment, 96 U. PA. L. REv. 402, 403 (1948).
12. Terry v. Adams, 345 U.S. 461, 473 (1953) (concurring opinion).
13. Mayor & City Council v. Dawson, 350 U.S. 877 (1956).
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property acquired, maintained, and operated by a state or its political
subdivisions must be available to citizens without discrimination because
of race.' 4 Likewise, state action results when the state leases its prop-
erty to a private party but retains control over the policies of the
lessee.15 However, when public property is leased to a private party
without any state control over its use being involved a finding of state
action appears to be more dubious. The proponents of the state prop-
erty theory declare that whenever property is leased to a private in-
dividual or group for a public purpose the lessee is subject to the same
constitutional restraints on its use as the state.16 However, the cases do
not seem to substantiate such a broad generalization.
In cases which would come within the ambit of the state property
theory certain elements have always been present. The first of these
elements is naturally a lease of public property from a federal,
17 state,'8
or municipal'O government. Next it appears that the. property must be
more than a bare lot of land; it must have been improved with public
funds.2 0  The problem that arises is how much of an improvement is
required. Must the facility itself be provided or need only the building
which is to house the facility be provided with government funds?
Since in most of the cases the facility was in fact provided there is
little discussion of that point. However, in Wilmington Parking
Authority v. Burton,21 where only the bare minimum of necessary space
was provided with public funds, the court failed to find state action and
emphasized that the facility itself was furnished with private capital.
Thus it would seem that the facility must be constructed with public
funds or at least public funds must constitute a substantial portion of
the money expended to furnish the facility. The third of the requisite
elements is that the property be used by the lessee for a public purpose.
There is no litmus paper test to determine just what is a public purpose,
however, whether the activity involved is open to the public or a large
segment thereof is the most important single consideration.
22
14. 279 F.2d 751, 753 (4th Cir. 1960).
15. Anderson v. Moses, 185 F. Supp. 727 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
16. Shanks, "State Action" and The Girard College Case, 105 U. PA. L. Rev.
213, 221, 227 (1956).
17. Nash v. Air Terminal Service, 85 F. Supp. 545 (E.D. Va. 1949).
18. Dep't of Conservation & Dev. v. Tate, 231 F.2d 615 (4th Cir. 1956), cert.
denied, 352 U.S. 838 (1956).
19. Kern v. City Comm'rs, 151 Kan. 565, 100 P.2d 709 (1940).
20. Holley v. City of Portsmouth, 150 F. Supp. 6 (E.D. Va. 1957) (dictum).
Suppose private capital and public monies are co-mingled to purchase or improve
land. The Supreme Court of Delaware in Wilmington Parking Authority v. Burton,
157 A.2d 894 (Del. 1960), declared that where public monies constituted only 15%
of the total fund state action would not result. However, it would seem that state
action should result whenever public monies constitute a substantial portion of the
total fund involved.
21. 157 A.2d 894 (Del. 1960). See Holley v. City of Portsmouth, supra note 20,
at 9 n.1, where the court declared in dictum that the government must actually supply
the facility itself if it is to be held responsible for the actions of the lessee.
22. Shanks, supra note 16, at 225.
[VOL. 6.220
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By far the most vexatious problem in this area is the determination
of whether the lease has been made in good faith or is a sham made
solely to aid in discrimination. In an obvious analogy to corporation
cases, some courts have declared that they will pierce any superficial
form.23  These courts make an allegation and proof of intent to work
discrimination via the lease a necessary element to justify holding the
lessee subject to constitutional limitations. Thus in Easterly v. Dempster24
a city leased its municipal golf course because it was losing money in
its operation. When the lessee, who had complete control over the use
of the golf course, denied admittance to plaintiff, a Negro, the court
found no state action because the lease was a good faith measure utilized
by the city for financial reasons and not a mere sham to avoid the
limitations of the fourteenth amendment. Although no court has flatly
declared that a showing of intent to discriminate via a lease was not
a necessary element, some courts have done so by implication. In Kern
v. City Comm'rs25 the lessee of a municipal swimming pool constructed
with public funds was found to have unlawfully discriminated on the
basis of color. The state action question was decided on the pleadings
which contained no averment of the city's bad faith in leasing the pool,
but nonetheless, the court held the lessees subject to the constitutional
limitation. A fair conclusion from this case is that discriminatory intent
is not necessary to a finding of state action and consequent subjection of
the lessee to the same limitations on the use of the leased property that
would be involved if the lessor had itself operated the facility. The case
of Dep't of Conservation & Tate26 would seem to support this conclusion.
In that case the state had begun to arrange a lease of state parks in order
to circumvent the expected result of an action by a group of Negroes to
gain admittance to a park which had been built with state funds. The
court in granting an injunction in the case declared that the state has
a positive duty to see that the lease of the state parks does not directly
or indirectly operate so as to discriminate against members of any race.
No showing of bad faith was required, and it appears that the court
did not deem such a necessary element. However, the intent to dis-
criminate was obvious even to the most casual observer and it is uncer-
tain to what extent this factor contributed to the court's decision. Similar
situations have been presented in which the court mentions and ob-
viously assumes bad faith but speaks in language that would apply even
where the lease is made in good faith. 27 Other courts have tried to steer
23. Culver v. City of Warren, 84 Ohio App. 373, 83 N.E.2d 82 (1948). Just
as a subsidiary or auxiliary corporation which is created by a parent corporation
merely as an agent for the latter may be regarded as identical with the parent
corporation the acts of an individual may be regarded as the acts of the state
in a similar situation.
24. 112 F. Supp. 214 (E.D. Tenn. 1953).
25. 151 Kan. 565, 100 P.2d 709 (1940).
26. 231 F.2d 615 (4th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 352 U.S. 838 (1956).
27. Lawrence v. Hancock, 76 F. Supp. 1004 (S.D. W.Va. 1948).
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a middle course, as in Derrington v. Plummer2s where the lessee of a
cafeteria in a newly constructed courthouse refused to serve plaintiff,
a Negro. Although it was found that the lease had been made in good faith
the court found state action, distinguishing between surplus govern-
ment property and property needed for county purposes and held that
only where there is a lease of surplus property must plaintiff show an
intent to discriminate via the lease.
Let us suppose that a municipality leases an auditorium to a group
which has complete control over the auditorium during the term of the
lease. The lease is for a relatively short time and the lessee discriminates
against Negroes by refusing to allow them admittance. Let us further
suppose that the auditorium can also be leased by Negroes on the same
terms. In this situation there is a lease of improved public property to a
private group, which property is to be used for a public purpose. How-
ever, the problem presented is whether the fact the lease is for a relatively
short time and the property is available to Negroes on identical terms is
sufficient to relieve the state of the responsibility for the discriminatory
action of the lessee. The case of Harris v. St. Louis29 held that in such
a situation the discriminatory action of the lessee is not state action;
however, that case was decided during the reign of the now repudiated
"separate but equal" doctrine. When a case on analogous facts reached
the Supreme Court of the United States after the decision in Brown v.
Board of Education,"° the Court remanded the case to be considered in
light of the Brown decision. 31 Since the doctrine of "separate but equal"
was the only reason for differentiating between the two cases it would
seem that the same rules that apply to long term leases should now
apply in the short term lease situation. Thus if the auditorium is leased
for a function that is open to the public the lessee should be subject to
the same constitutional limitations on its use as the state. But if the
lease is to a private organization such as the Masons, or even the Ku
Klux Klan, such private organization will be free to make its own
requirements for admission. 32
The question of intent is the crucial one. If there is intent on the
part of the state to work discrimination through the lease state action
will definitely be found, but if there is no showing of intent whether
state action will be found depends upon the considerations discussed above.
28. 240 F.2d 922 (5th Cir. 1956), cert. denied, 353 U.S. 924 (1957). See Coke
v. Atlanta, 184 F. Supp. 579 (N.D. Ga. 1960), where the reasoning of the Derrington
case is adopted.
29. 233 Mo. App. 911, 11 S.W.2d 995 (1938).
30. 347 U.S. 483 (1954).
31. Muir v. Louisville Park Theatrical Ass'n, 347 U.S. 971 (1954).
32. Abernathy, Expansion of the State Action Concept Under the Fourteenth
Amendment, 43 CORN LL L.Q. 375, 398 (1958).
[VOL. 6.
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B.
State Assistance Theory
Valuable assistance can be given to a private enterprise by the
state in various ways. Proponents of the state assistance theory argue
that any operation which is public in nature should be subject to constitu-
tional limitations in its exercise when it is encouraged by state assistance
33
such as the appropriation of state monies therefor, use of eminent domain
proceedings and granting of tax benefits. The cases, however, indicate
that the further element of state control is also necessary. 34
No general rules can be laid down for the determination of the
amount and kind of assistance and control that is essential. In Kerr v.
Enoch Pratt Free Library35 the state assistance consisted of legislative
enactments, tax exemptions and direct financial aid. The control exercised
by the city consisted of approval of the budget for the library, ownership of
the real and personal property involved and establishment of rules for
the appointment of trustees. In finding state action when the library dis-
criminated, the court asked: "How then can the well known policy
of the Library, so long continued and now formally expressed in the
resolution of the Board, be justified as solely the act of a private organiza-
tion when the state, through the municipality, continues to support it
with the means of its existence?"3 6 Perhaps then the state assistance
must be found to be critical to the continued existence of the facility or
service before state action will be found. In Norris v. Mayor & City
Council of Baltimore3 7 the state assistance involved was direct financial
aid and a lease of city property. The court in finding no state action
emphasized that there was no showing of city control over the operations
or policy of the recipient and that the facility involved was private rather
than public. Another factor which the court did not mention was that
the assistance was not critical to the existence of the facility. The case
of Dorsey v. Stuyvesant Town 38 reached the same result as the Norris
case, but for different reasons. The town of Stuyvesant was built by the
Metropolitan Insurance Company and was wholly owned subsidiary of
that company. Land was taken by the city through its eminent domain
power and sold to the defendant corporation, and in addition defendant
was granted tax exemptions for twenty-five years. The New York Court
of Appeals held, in a four to three decision, that since there was neither
a private group exercising a governmental function nor direct govern-
33. Abernathy, supra note 31, at 386, 391.
34. Norris v. Mayor & City Council of Baltimore, 78 F. Supp. 451 (D. Md.
1948).
35. 149 F.2d 212 (4th Cir. 1945), cert. denied, 326 U.S. 721 (1945).
36. Id. at 219. Compare Girard Will Case, 386 Pa. 548, 127 A.2d 287 (1956),
rev'd, 353 U.S. 230 (1957).
37. 78 F. Supp. 451 (D. Md. 1948).
38. 299 N.Y. 519, 87 N.E.2d 541 (1949), cert. denied, 339, U.S. 981 (1950).
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mental aid to the discrimination there could be no state action under
the fourteenth amendment. However, in no previous case had it been held
that there must be direct aid to the discrimination. Although there was
no actual state control involved in that case the city had the power to
control the town by making requirements for its prospective tenants and
there was state assistance amounting to over a million dollars. Aside
from the fact that there was only power to control and not actual control
the Dorsey case is indistinguishable in its essential facts from the
Kerr case. In both cases the operation was public in nature and in
both the assistance given was crucial to the existence of the private
enterprise. The fact that there was no actual control but only the power to
control should not be determinative since neither a state nor its sub-
divisions should be allowed to escape its obligations by abdicating its
power. The cases rather should turn on the basis of the amount and type
of control which the state is able to exercise. A "meticulous control over
the operations" of the public facility or service 0 should render the actions
of the discriminating individual state action if the requisite state assistance
is also present.
C.
Grant of Special Privileges or Powers
Closely akin to the state assistance theory is the view that when a
state grants special powers or privileges to a private party or group the
state is under a positive obligation to see that this power is not used
in a discriminatory manner. 40 In determining just what powers and
privileges will render the recipient, in effect, an agent of the state each
case will have to be decided on its own peculiar facts; however, the fol-
lowing test is a useful guide: Does the power or privilege confer on a
private party an especially advantageous position so that in substance the
state can be said to be taking part in the project ?41
In considering this theory the question immediately occurs as to
whether the grant of a corporate charter or a license necessary to do
business is sufficient state action to render the recipient subject to con-
stitutional limitations. In Williams v. Howard Johnson's Restaurant
42
plaintiff was refused service in a restaurant which had obtained a state
license. The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit held that the mere
grant of a license to operate a restaurant does not constitute sufficient
state action to render the restaurateur subject to constitutional limitations
on his actions, emphasizing that the licensing included no control over the
management of the restaurant. In Slack v. Atl. White Tower4 3 a foreign
39. Anderson v. Moses, 185 F. Supp. 727 (S.D.N.Y. 1960).
40. Shanks, supra note 16, at 232.
41. Id. at 233.
42. 268 F.2d 845 (4th Cir. 1959). See generally 6 VILL. L. Rtv. 301 (1959).
43. 181 F. Supp. 124 (D. Md. 1960).
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corporation, to which Maryland had issued a restaurant license and
which it had admitted to do business within her borders, discriminated.
The Maryland District Court likewise held this insufficient state action
to make the discrimination of the restaurateur the discrimination of the
state.
However, if the privilege granted is exclusive it would seem more
likely that the state would be responsible for the actions of the recipient.
In Steele v. Louisville & N.R.R.44 plaintiff sought to enjoin the en-
forcement of discriminatory agreements among the defendants. Mr.
Justice Murphy, in his concurring opinion,45 declared that a union could not
discriminate in the area in which a federal statute gave it the privilege of
exclusive bargaining power. This reasoning would seem to apply with
equal force when a state gives a private organization special privileges or
powers, except that the fourteenth and not the fifth amendment would
prescribe the limitations on the action of the organization. In Bowman v.
Birmingham Transit Co.46 a public utility was granted a special power to
make rules for seating its passengers and to make the violation of such
rules a crime. The Court of Appeals for the Fourth Circuit declared
that this privilege rendered the actions of the transit company the actions
of the state and therefore subject to the fourteenth amendment. It would
seem then that whenever a private individual is given authority in an
area traditionally controlled by the state and through the use of this
authority he could deprive others of civil rights, he should be subject to
fourteenth amendment restrictions in the exercise of this authority.
The court distinguished between a special franchise and an ordinary
franchise. 47 An ordinary franchise is one which merely grants the
privilege of existing in a corporate form, while a special franchise grants
certain additional rights and privileges. Thus a special franchise would be
one given to allow a private party to do what a state deems useful for
the public necessity or convenience. It involves the use of state prop-
erty for private gain to perform a public function. Because of the
advantageous position that it confers on the recipient and the closeness of
the relationship to the state, it should render the recipient subject to
constitutional limitations in its exercise, even if the privilege is not
exclusive.
Let us suppose that all the milk producers and distributors in a
given state refuse to sell to Negroes and all such producers and dis-
tributors are incorporated in and licensed by the state. Let us further
suppose that the entire operation is wholly intrastate. Would the corpo-
rate charter and the licensing be sufficient to render the milk producers
and distributors subject to the fourteenth amendment? In view of the
great public interest of the state in seeing to it that the people are
44. 323 U.S. 192 (1944).
45. Id. at 202 (concurring opinion.)
46. 280 F.2d 531 (5th Cir. 1960).
47. Id. at 535.
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properly fed and because the state has granted to the discriminating party
certain privileges and powers, it would seem that the producers and
distributors would be held to be subject to the fourteenth amendment.
Thus although the mere grant of a corporate charter or a license to
do business is not alone sufficient to render the recipient subject to con-
stitutional limitations on his actions, where the added element of con-
siderable public interest is involved the courts might well intervene. An
exclusive privilege or a special franchise would also be sufficient, as would
authority to act in an area in which the state usually retains complete con-
trol where this authority carries with it the power to effectively hinder
others in the exercise of their civil right.
II.
THE EXTREMITIS OF THE STATE ACTION CONCEPT
At the extreme edge of the penumbral area surrounding the state
action concept two unsettled problems dwell. The first is the question
of to what extent can the rationale underlying the case of Shelley v.
Kraemer48 be applied to different and varying factual situations? And
the second is the question of when state inaction results in a finding of
state action? The remainder of this comment will deal with an analysis
of these two problems.
A.
Extension of the Doctrine of Shelley v. Kraemer
In Shelley v. Kraemer 0 property owners who were the beneficiaries
of a racially restrictive covenant sought to restrain Negroes from taking
title to property purchased by them in violation of the covenant. The
Supreme Court of Missouri directed the trial court to enforce the covenant,
but the Supreme Court of the United States reversed the Missouri court
and held that it was state action violative of the fourteenth amendment
for a state court to enforce a racially restrictive covenant. 50 The Court
declared: "The Constitution confers upon no individual the right to de-
mand action by the state which results in the denial of equal protection of
the laws to other individuals." 51 Thus the test implicit in Shelley is that
whenever actions by the state, through its legislature, executive, or
judiciary, will directly aid a private party in denying to others the
equal protection of the laws, prohibited state action results. The later
case of Barrows v. Jackson52 went even further in declaring that a state
court may not grant damages to the aggrieved party when a racially
48. 334 U.S. 1 (1948).
49. Ibid.
50. Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1, 20 (1948).
51. Id. at 18.
52. 346 U.S. 249 (1953).
[VOL. 6.
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restrictive covenant is breached. Thus it would seem that the aid need
not be direct if it is sought through traditional state functions.
The rationale of the Shelley case was later sought to be applied to
a situation in which a testator in his will attempted to revoke any gift
granted therein if the recipient should marry any person not of the
Hebrew faith, but there the Supreme Judicial Court of Massachusetts
held that a decree of a probate court that had the effect of enforcing such
a restriction was not state action. 53 The court disposed of Shelley by
judicial fiat, declaring simply that clearly a will is distinguishable from
a restrictive covenant, without elaborating on the distinction. Although
the rule of Shelley would seem to logically apply to this situation, the
court apparently felt that federal interference was unwarranted in such a
private matter as disposition of property by will among members of a
family since there was not a sufficient public interest involved.
Now, let us hypothesize that a Negro is refused service in a res-
taurant because of his color. When he is requested to leave he refuses
but remains peacefully seated in the restaurant. Let us further suppose
that, on the owners request, a public officer ejects the Negro. State
action? This situation would seem to be one where the principle under-
lying the Shelley case would apply. In Whiteside v. So. Bus Lines54
the court declared, albeit in dictum, that ". . . if state action is a pre-
requisite to the invalidity of the regulation here considered [bus company
seating regulations] as applied to appellant, the state action is clearly
to be perceived in the ejection of the appellant by the state police officer.'' 55
It should be noted that here the state action applied only to the particular
transaction and this would always be the case in this type of situation.
The same question arose in Valle v. Stengel56 where the court directly
held that a chief of police who ejects Negroes from an amusement park
makes the acts of both the officer and the amusement park owner acts done
under the color of state law. However, in Dinwziddie v. Brown 7 the
court held that where state officers act wholly within their official re-
sponsibilities and do not intentionally co-operate in any scheme to dis-
criminate they are not acting under color of state law and their action is
not state action for fourteenth amendment purposes. This conclusion
would not seem to follow since although their knowledge may be relevant
as to their own individual responsibility in a civil action, it has nothing to
do with whether they were acting under color of state law as far as the
persons they were aiding are concerned. The case of Griffin v. Collins5 8
held that the mere arrest by Maryland police of Negroes who refused to
leave an amusement park was not state action so as to bring the conduct
53. Gordon v. Gordon, 332 Mass. 197, 124 N.E.2d 228 (1955).
54. 177 F.2d 949 (6th Cir. 1949).
55. Id. at 953. (Emphasis added.)
56. 176 F.2d 697 (3rd Cir. 1949).
57. 231 F.2d 465 (4th Cir. 1956).
58. 29 U.S.L. W94K 2109 (D. Md. Sept. 20, 1960).
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under the fourteenth amendment. The court, however, particularly
avoided deciding whether state action would arise from the fact that
park guards specifically charged with the enforcement of the discrimina-
tory policy were all appointed special deputy sheriffs.59
It is submitted that the reasoning of the Shelley case should be ap-
plied to the arresting officer situation. To be sure, just as a citizen
has a right to have access to the courts, he has the right to have police
eject trespassers from his property. However, in neither case does he
have the right to require the state to aid him in his discriminatory policy.
It will no doubt be argued that private property is in fact valueless if
there is no police protection for it and that such a refusal in this situa-
tion will deprive the property owner of equal protection of the laws.
The Court contended with a similar argument in the Shelley and Barrows
cases and disposed of it by declaring that the Constitution gives no
individual the right to demand action by the state which would result
in the denial of equal protection of the laws to others.0 0 Applying this
reasoning to our hypothetical situation, the refusal of the police to give
assistance to racial discrimination by ejecting a sit-in would not deprive
the complaining property owner of equal protection of the laws, in fact; the
ejection of the sit-in would deprive him of equal protection.
B.
State Inaction as State Action
Let us here reconsider a hypothetical case stated previously, in a dif-
ferent light. Suppose all the milk producers in a state refuse to sell milk
to Negroes. All the producers are incorporated in and licensed by the
state and the production and distribution is purely intrastate. While it
seems clear that a state, under its police power, could act to prevent this,
discrimination, must it so act? Or, more precisely, will the refusal of a
state to act in such a situation be state action for the purpose of the
fourteenth amendment?
It has long been thought that the equal protection clause could be-
violated by state inaction as well as by positive state action,01 although
later cases have modified this position to an extent. In Catlette v. United
States6 2 a deputy sheriff did not protect a number of Jehovah's Wit-
nesses who were attacked. In finding this inaction to be state action the
court held that culpable inaction by a state official violates the equal pr-
tection clause of the fourteenth amendment. In a case which arose under
a similar factual situation the Court of Appeals for the Fifth Circuit
stated: "There was a time when equal protection of law was confined to
59. Id. at 2110.
60. Barrows v. Jackson, 346 U.S. 249, 260 (1953) ; Shelley v. Kraemer, 334 U.S. 1,
18 (1948).
61. Louisville & N.R.R. v. Bosworth, 230 Fed. 191 (E.D. Ky.), modified, 244
U.S. 522 (1917); United States v. Blackburn, 23 Fed. Cas. 1158 (No. 14603)
(W.D. Mo. 1874) (charge to jury).
62. 132 F.2d 902 (4th Cir. 1943).
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affirmative acts, but the law now is that culpable official inaction may
also constitute a denial of equal protection." 63 Thus it is inaction in the
face of a duty to act, culpable inaction, that violates the equal protection
clause.
Having determined that state inaction in the face of a duty to act
can be state action it is necessary to determine when the state has a
duty to act. A state must act to prevent a criminal act. If it does not act
there is culpable inaction and state action as comprehended by the four-
teenth amendment results. Whether a state has a duty to act when it
knows that one person is being discriminated against because of color by
another person is not clear. It seems certain that where the discrimination
is violative of the Constitution, that is, where it is done under color of
state law, a failure to act by state officials who have the power and
authority to prevent the discrimination will also violate the fourteenth
amendment.6 4 However, no court has gone so far as to say that a state
has a duty to prevent private acts of discrimination not in themselves
violative of the Constitution. 5
Another aspect of this problem is whether the fourteenth amend-
ment can be interpreted so as to impose on the states a positive duty to
prevent all discrimination in certain spheres of economic and social
intercourse. This interpretation would supply the duty which would
render state inaction in these fields "state action."
The mere fact that the amendment is stated in negative language
and has not been so interpreted in previous decisions should not be con-
trolling. The argument may be presented that it is the duty of the
state merely to uphold the Constitution and since private acts of dis-
crimination are not unconstitutional the states have no duty to prevent
such discrimination. But this argument does not reach the problem of
whether such discrimination is in fact "state action," and would be
valid only if the fourteenth amendment were held not to impose on the
states a positive duty. Thus, if the United States Supreme Court were to
decide that the fourteenth amendment does have a positive application
to the states, then the states would have a duty to act in certain situations
and the failure of the state to act in these instances would amount to a
state sanctioning the private discrimination and the discrimination would
then become violative of the fourteenth amendment. Under this view
where there exists a right protected by the fourteenth amendment against
improper state abridgement, and where the state could, within the due
process clause, constitutionally create a similar right running against
63. Lynch v. United States, 189 F.2d 476, 479 (5th Cir. 1951), cert. denied,
342 U.S. 831 (1951).
64. Robeson v. Fanelli, 94 F. Supp. 62 (S.D.N.Y. 1950); See 17 Stat. 13,
15 (1871), 42 U.S.C. §§ 1985-86 (1957).
65. See Abernathy, slitpra note 26, at 416, where the author states that in his
opinion this, in effect, is the position of a dissent by Mr. Justice Douglas in the
case of Black v. Cutter Laboratories, 351 U.S. 292 (1956). Mr. Justice Black and
Chief Justice Warren concurred in the dissent.
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private abridgement, the state acts in violation of the fourteenth amend-
ment if it fails to offer a remedy, upon request, against such private
abridgement.66 This would not mean that henceforth private acts of
discrimination will be unconstitutional, nor would it mean that the four-
teenth amendment now applies to individuals. What it would mean is
that the state, because of the fourteenth amendment, has a duty to see
that no discrimination by individuals is practiced within the area in which
a state can constitutionally prevent such discrimination; and further, that
the state would be responsible for its own inaction in this field. Thus the
fourteenth amendment would act upon the state which in turn would act
upon private individuals to make certain that no individual does what the
fourteenth amendment forbids a state from doing.
If this construction of the fourteenth amendment were judicially
adopted, and this is doubtful at this time, it would become necessary to
determine the areas in which the state may lawfully prevent acts of dis-
crimination. It is within the ambit of the police power that the state
should be compelled to prevent private acts of discrimination since this
is the area in which it has acted to protect the health, welfare, and
morals of the people. 67 Some states have already passed civil rights
acts dealing with education,68 employment,69 housing70 and public accom-
modation. 71 It is in these and other areas of fundamental and indis-
pensable rights that the fourteenth amendment should require the states
to act. The view that the state has a duty to act in these areas is con-
sistent with the modern political view that the state is not only a
negative censor but has a duty to provide for the welfare of the people
when they are unable to adequately provide for themselves. 72 In addi-
tion, since a state can deny or deprive individuals of rights as effectively
by failing to secure the rights as it can by affirmative denial thereof, it
is reasonable to make the state responsible for this failure by placing a
duty on the state to secure these rights. In answer to the hypothetical ques-
tion previously posed, it would seem that a state would have a duty to act
in this situation and its refusal to act would be a state sanctioning of
the discrimination which would result in discriminatory state action vio-
lative of the fourteenth amendment.
III.
CONCLUSION
The essential characteristic of state action, as we have seen, is not
really state action at all but is state responsibility. When a state acts it
66. Black v. Cutter Laboratories, 351 U.S. 292 (1956); Abernathy, supra note
26, at 412-18.
67. See Comment, 47 MICH. L. Rev. 369, 372-73 (1949).
68. GREENBERG, RACE RELATIONS AND AMERICAN LAW 388 (1959).
69. Id. at 379.
70. Greenberg, op. cit. supra note 69, at 390.
71. Greenberg, op. cit. supra note 69, at 375.
72. PRESIDENT'S COMM. ON CIVIL RIGHTS, To SEcuR" THESE RIGHTS 9 (1947).
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will be responsible for its actions and when it fails to act it is responsible
for such abdication which occurs in the face of a duty to act. The re-
sponsibility when it acts can be supplied by various connections between
the state and the discriminating individual such as a lease of state prop-
erty, a grant of state aid plus state control, or a grant of special powers and
privileges. Each of these nexus has been held to be sufficient to render
the state responsible for any discrimination and to render the actions
of the private party subject to the constitutional limitations of the
fourteenth amendment. The state responsibility for inaction, it is sub-
mitted, can only be found when the state refuses to act when it has a
duty to act. This duty may arise from the nature of the private activity
or by positive command of the fourteenth amendment.
The expansion of the state action concept is a vindication of Mr.
Justice Harlan's dissent in the Civil Rights Cases and it shows the
tremendous capacity of the law for growth and adaptation. It is true that
the law cannot legislate morals but the law can, within prescribed
spheres of action, prevent prejudice from spilling over into discriminatory
conduct. Prejudice can only be eliminated by education, but the effects
of prejudice can be eliminated by law. The extension of the state action
concept shows that the courts are aware of this "American Dilemma"
and of the new found social consciousness on the part of a great segment
of the American populace. It is an attempt of the courts to reflect in a
nineteenth century amendment to an eighteenth century Constitution, the
social mores of a twentieth century people.
Joseph G. Manta*
LABOR LAW-ARBITRATION-LIMITED FUNCTION OF THE COURTS
IN SUITS TO COMPEL ARBITRATION UNDER SECTION 301 (a).
In 1957, the United States Supreme Court in the case of Textile
Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills,1 rendered a landmark decision in the
field of labor arbitration. Faced with the problem of whether a grievance
arbitration provision in a collective bargaining agreement could be
specifically enforced in a federal court by reason of section 301(a) of
the Labor Management Relations Act,2 the Court not only upheld the
* Aided in research by Lewis H. Gold.
1. 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
2. 61 Stat. 156 (1947), 29 U.S.C. § 185(a) (1952), provides: "Suits for viola-
tion of contracts between an employer and a labor organization representing em-
ployees in an industry affecting commerce as defined in this Act, or between any
such labor organizations, may be brought in any district court of the United States
having jurisdiction of the parties, without respect to the amount in controversy or
without regard to the citizenship of the parties."
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district court's acceptance of jurisdiction, but also determined that sec-
tion 301 "authorizes federal courts to fashion a body of federal law for
the enforcement of these collective bargaining agreements." 3 In fashioning
this body of law, the policy to be applied is that reflected in our national
labor laws.4 More specifically, the policy is one of promoting industrial
stabilization through the collective bargaining agreement5 and would
be epitomized in an agreement containing both an arbitration provision
for all unresolved grievances and an absolute prohibition of strikes. Having
been thus admonished to encourage arbitration, the federal courts com-
menced fashioning a body of law. It is the purpose of this comment to
indicate the development of this body of law insofar as it restricts the
function of the court in a suit to compel arbitration6 brought under an
agreement containing a normal arbitration clause, such as the following:
Any disputes, misunderstandings, differences or grievances
arising between the parties as to the meaning, interpretation and
application of the provisions of this agreement, which are not adjusted
as herein provided, shall be submitted to the Board of Arbitration
for decision . ..7
It will be presumed throughout that the adjustment procedures "herein
provided" have failed, thus effectuating the possible application of the
:quoted clause.
I.
JURISDICTIONAL CONSIDERATIONS.
Although Lincoln Mills8 upheld the jurisdiction of federal courts to
compel arbitration and, in addition, authorized the federal courts to
fashion a body of federal law for the enforcement of collective bargaining
agreements, the opinion did not make it clear whether, in a suit to
enforce the arbitration provision of a collective bargaining agreement,
state jurisdiction, as well as the application of state substantive law, is
foreclosed. Federal district court opinions indicate that the jurisdiction
conferred on the federal courts by section 301 is not exclusive, and that
Congress did not intend to preclude state courts from entertaining suits
for violation of contracts between employers and labor organizations
3. Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills of Alabama, 353 U.S. 448, 451
'(1957).
4. Id. at 456-57.
5. Id. at 453-54.
6. Suits for the enforcement of the arbitrator's award are also within the
ambit of this comment since the policy behind enforcement of an award is necessarily
the same as that behind compelling arbitration. See A. L. Kornman Co. v.
Amalgamated Clothing Workers, 264 F.2d 733, 737 (6th Cir. 1959). The policy behind
limiting the function of the courts is likewise the same in both cases. See United
:Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 80 Sup. Ct. 1358, 1360 (1960).
7. See United Steelworkers v. Am. Mfg. Co., 80 Sup. Ct. 1343, 1345 n.1 (1960).
8. 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
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representing employees in an industry affecting commerce. 9 Representa-
tive of state court decisions in this area is McCarrol v. Los Angeles County
Dist. Council of Carpenters,'0 which held that "state courts . . . have
concurrent jurisdiction with federal courts over actions that can be
brought in the federal courts under section 301." 11
Concurrent jurisdiction of state and federal courts will not result,
however, in the application of a different body of rules by each court
accepting jurisdiction to enforce collective bargaining contracts. On the
contrary, both federal and state courts have guaranteed a uniform body of
rules by holding that only the federal substantive law may be applied
in suits for the enforcement of collective bargaining contracts. 12  Yet
state law in the labor arbitration field is hardly insignificant. Lincoln
Mills13 has instructed that state law may be consulted in order to find the
rule that will best effectuate the federal policy, but only if compatible
with the purpose of section 301.14 Any state law so applied will, of
course, be absorbed as federal law.' 5 Thus, in determining the limitations
imposed by the federal substantive law, state court decisions will be
relevant only insofar as they have been absorbed into the federal law,
or, in the event that there has not yet been an opportunity for absorption,
insofar as the state law is conducive to the policy reflected in the national
labor laws.
Nor need there be any fear, it would seem, that the National Labor
Relations Board would destroy uniformity in the fashioning of this federal
substantive law by virtue of the Board's pre-emption in the area of
unfair labor practices. It is generally held that the federal district courts
have jurisdiction under section 301 to order arbitration of a grievance
even though the grievance might also constitute an unfair labor practice
within the exclusive jurisdiction of the NLRB, since the submission to
arbitration will not affect the power of the Board to act.16
9. Minkoff v. Scranton Frocks, Inc., 172 F. Supp. 870, 877 (S.D.N.Y. 1959);
Ingraham Co. v. Local 260, Int'l Union, 171 F. Supp. 103, 106 (D. Conn. 1959).
Contra, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v. Gen. Elec. Co., 164 F. Supp. 794, 798 (S.D.
Ohio 1958).
10. 49 Cal. 2d 45, 315 P.2d 322 (1957), cert. denied, 355 U.S. 932 (1958).
11. Id. at 60, 315 P.2d at 330.
12. Minkoff v. Scranton Frocks, Inc., 172 F. Supp. 870, 877 (S.D.N.Y. 1959);
Ingraham Co. v. Local 260, Int'l Union, 171 F. Supp. 103, 106 (D. Conn. 1959);
Oil and Chemical Workers v. Lone Star Prod. Co., 332 S.W.2d 151, 154 (Tex. 1959).
But cf. Ryan Aero v. Int'l Union, UAW, 179 F. Supp. 1 (S.D. Cal. 1959).
Compare McCarroll v. Los Angeles County Dist. Council of Carpenters, supra
note 11, in which a state court used procedural, as opposed to substantive law to
defeat the uniform approach desired in suits concerning collective bargaining agree-
ments.
13. Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
14. Id. at 457.
15. Ibid.
16. United Steelworkers v. New Park Mining Co., 273 F.2d 352 (10th Cir.
1959); Machinists Ass'n v. Cameron Iron Workers, 257 F.2d 467 (5th Cir. 1958),
cert. denied, 358 U.S. 880 (1958); Ryan Aero v. Int'l Union, UAW, 179 F. Supp.
1, 4 (S.D. Cal. 1959); Grunwald-Marx v. Clothing Workers, 52 Cal. 2d 568, 343
P.2d 23, 29 (1959).
COMMENTS
16
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 6, Iss. 2 [1961], Art. 5
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol6/iss2/5
VILLANOVA LAW REVIEW
II.
FINALITY OF ARBITRATOR'S DECISION.
In Engineers' Ass'n v. Sperry Gyroscope Co.'7 the Court of Appeals
for the Second Circuit stated, "We may look to the Federal Arbitration
Act which, though not binding upon us in suits brought under section
301, does provide a 'guiding analogy.' "Is Thus, prior to the United
States Supreme Court decision in the case of United Steelworkers v. Enter-
prise Wheel & Car Corp.,l9 the effect of which will be discussed subse-
quently, it would not have been beyond the realm of reasonable conjecture
to suppose that the federal courts, when dealing with the enforcement of
labor arbitration awards in suits under section 301, would fashion the
law applicable to the validity of the awards from the pattern established by
the Federal Arbitration Act.20 Section 10 of this act authorizes the federal
district court in which an award has been made to vacate the award:
(1) where the award was procured by corruption, fraud or undue
means; (2) where there was evident partiality or corruption on the
part of an arbitrator; (3) where an arbitrator was guilty of mis-
conduct in refusing to postpone a hearing where good cause was
shown for postponing it, or in refusing to hear evidence which was
pertinent and material to the case, or where the arbitrator was guilty
of any other misbehavior prejudicial to any of the parties; and
(4) where the arbitrator exceeded his powers, or so imperfectly
executed them that a mutual, final and definite award upon the subject
matter submitted was not made.2'
The function of courts, therefore, in suits to enforce an arbitration award,
would be restricted, in the absence of dishonorable practices, to a deter-
mination of whether the arbitrator exceeded his powers. But before
the court may address itself to this issue, it need first determine what
the powers of the arbitrator are, a determination which will depend, in any
given case, upon the scope of the arbitrator's powers as designated by the
arbitration provisions of the collective bargaining agreement.
In like manner, where suit is brought to compel arbitration under the
normal arbitration clause it is the function of the court to determine
whether the grievance for which arbitration is sought is an arbitrable
17. 251 F.2d 133 (2d Cir. 1957).
18. Id. at 136,
19. 363 U.S. 593, 80 Sup. Ct. 1358 (1960).
20. 61 Stat. 669 (1947), 9 U.S.C. § 10 (1947). See also 63 Stat. 107 (1949),
45 U.S.C. § 159 (1949); CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 1288; CONN. GEN. STAT. ANN.
ch. 909 §§ 52-418 (1958) ; MASS. GEN. LAWS ch. 150 C, § 11 (1959).
21. It should be noted that adoption of subsection (4) in full would be beyond
the realm of reasonable conjecture since a rule forbidding resubmission of an
imperfectly executed award, which rule was developed when the courts looked with
disfavor upon arbitration proceedings, is incompatible with the spirit of Lincoln
Mills. See Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp. v. United Steelworkers, 269 F.2d 327,
332 (4th Cir. 1959).
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grievance.2 2 Again such a determination will depend, in any given case,
on the scope of arbitrability as created by the arbitration provisions of
the collective bargaining agreement. The most common deterrent, there-
fore, to the exercise of an arbitrator's power, or to the enforcement of his
award, is a determination by the court that the parties have not agreed
to extend the scope of the arbitrator's power to include the grievance in
question.
III.
SCOPE OF ARBITRABILITY.
A.
Preliminary Considerations.
It is a recognized principle of arbitration law that the question of
arbitrability is for the courts to decide unless there has been a clear demon-
stration by the parties of an intent to vest in the arbitrator power to de-
termine the arbitrability of a grievance.23  One view of the function of
the court in deciding this issue has been aptly described by Judge
Magruder, of the Court of Appeals for the First Circuit in the case of
Local 149, Am. Fed'n of Technical Eng'rs v. Gen. Elec. Co.,24 as follows:
But when one of the parties needs the aid of a court, and asks
the court for a decree ordering specific performance of a contract to
arbitrate, we think that the court, before rendering such a decree,
has the inescapable obligation to determine as a preliminary matter that
the defendant has contracted to refer such issue to arbitration, and
has broken this promise.
In contrast with Judge Magruder's dutiful reluctance to abandon a
traditional function of the court is the liberal position taken by those
wv'ho, desirous of encouraging arbitration in accordance with the admoni-
tion of Lincoln Mills,25 are willing to enhance the authority of labor
arbitrators to include the determination of the issue of arbitrability, even
at the cost, of reducing court functions in labor arbitration to the
infinitesimal.2 6 The basis for this position is judicial incompetence in the
field of labor relations, as contrasted with a certain expertise among
arbitrators. Provocation for this point of view has been furnished by
22. United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Nay. Co., 80 Sup. Ct. 1343, 1353
n.7 (1960).
23. Ibid.
24. 250 F.2d 922, 927 (1st Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 938 (1958).
25. Textile Workers Union v. Lincoln Mills, 353 U.S. 448 (1957).
26. Local 149, Am. Fed'n of Technical Eng'rs v. Gen. Elec. Co., 250 F.2d
922, 926-27 (1st Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 938 (1958) ; see, e.g., Refinery
Employees Union v. Continental Oil Co., 268 F.2d 447, 460 (5th Cir. 1959) (dis-
senting opinion) ; Summers, Judicial Review of Labor Arbitration or Alice Through
the Looking Glass, 2 BU:VALO L. Rv. 1 (1952).
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cases in which the court, in carrying out its function as enunciated by
Judge Magruder, has incidentally, but necessarily, determined the merits
of the grievance. Illustrative of such cases is Employees Labor Ass'n v.
Proctor & Gamble,27 in which the collective bargaining agreement pro-
vided that all new jobs should be posted so that employees might bid for
them. Defendant company introduced into its operations a fork lift
machine to which the company did not assign an exclusive operator.
Rather, the machine was operated by a considerable number of different
employees from different departments, eyen though it was in operation
during ninety percent of the working day. Suit to compel arbitration was
brought and the cout decided, under the normal arbitration clause, that
the matter would be arbitrable as to whether the job created was a "new"
job only if the court should first find that a "job" had been created, since
otherwise the dispute would not concern an issue which the company
agreed to submit to arbitration. The court thereupon decided that the
machine was a tool used to perform jobs already in existence and that
no job had been created, thus, necessarily precluding the arbitrator
from determining whether a new job had been created. Thus, the court's
decision in determining the question of arbitrability was unavoidably
determinative of the merits of the grievance, a result which provokes in
the liberal camp a charge of court usurpation of a function entrusted to
the arbitrator.
These two points of view served as boundaries to encompass the
developing body of substantive law with regard to the function of the
courts in the field of labor arbitration. The Court of Appeals for the
Second Circuit initiated a middle ground in Eng'rs Ass'n v. Sperry
Gyroscope Co.2 8 by reserving, at least to an extent, the function of the
court without impinging upon the power of the arbitrator to decide the
merits of the dispute. This was accomplished by requiring a lesser amount
of proof to warrant a court determination of arbitrability than is re-
quired to warrant an arbitration award of relief on the claim. The court
would require only that the moving party produce evidence which tends
to establish his claim while the arbitrator is to weigh all the evidence and
determine whether the contract was broken.29
Since one of these divergent viewpoints, or some variation thereof,
was exercising its influence on every decision which the federal courts
rendered in the field of labor arbitration, the substantive federal law that
was fashioned was inevitably a confused body of law. To achieve uni-
27. 172 F. Supp. 210 (D. Kan. 1959).
28. 251 F.2d 133 (2d Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 932 (1958).
29. Id. at 137. In Boston Mut. Life Ins. Co. v. Ins. Agents' Int'l Union, 258
F.2d 516, 517 (1st Cir. 1958), judge Magruder, after reaffirming his position as here-
tofore indicated, made a stride in the direction of the second circuit's policy by
adding to a restatement of his policy: "Of course, practical considerations as to
what would best promote effective labor arbitration might lead the court, in
construing ambiguous language, to adopt an interpretation giving a broad scope
to the arbitrator's function."
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formity in the federal substantive law, the United States Supreme Court,
on June 20, 1960, handed down three decisions80 through which it spoke
quite definitely on the respective roles of courts and arbitrators in labor
arbitration, thereby furnishing the courts with a tangible yardstick by
which they might fashion in the future the federal substantive law with
regard to the function of court and arbitrator in the field of labor ar-
bitration.
B.
Frivolous Claims.
In the Am. Mfg. Co. case 3' the Court held that the judiciary may not
deprive a party of his right to arbitration by determining that his grievance
is frivolous and patently baseless, since, "when the judiciary undertakes
to determine the merits of a grievance under the guise of interpreting the
grievance procedure of collective bargaining agreements, it usurps a
function which under the regime is entrusted to the arbitration tribunal."3
The Court of Appeals for the Sixth Circuit, which the United States
Supreme Court reversed, had held that although the grievance would be
arbitrable if meritorious, the evidence indicated that the grievance was
"a frivolous and patently baseless one, not subject to arbitration under
the collective bargaining agreement."3 3 The court of appeals cited as
authority dictum from a Judge Magruder opinion,34 even though Judge
Magruder had, in fact, previously denied allegiance with this viewpoint
when, in a 1958 case, 35 he aligned himself with the point of view now
adopted by the United States Supreme Court. Indeed, theorizing that
a court can dispose of a crystal clear claim, Judge Magruder found the
arbitrator in an analogous situation, to be lawgiver, as well as trier of
fact, so that a grievance clearly not meritorious would not deprive him of
his jurisdiction. On the contrary, he found the merits of the grievance
to be beyond the reach of the court, as long as the parties had agreed to
submit the issue to arbitration. The federal substantive law has been
settled, then, with regard to frivolous claims, and without serious offense to
any of the divergent viewpoints contending to fashion the federal sub-
stantive law in the field of labor arbitration, for the Court of Appeals for
30. United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 80 Sup. Ct. 1358(1960); United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Nav. Co., 80 Sup. Ct. 1347(1960); United Steelworkers v. Am. Mfg. Co., 80 Sup. Ct. 1343 (1960).
31. United Steelworkers v. Am. Mfg. Co., 80 Sup. Ct. 1343 (1960).
32. Id. at 1347. This was an action to compel arbitration of a grievance in-
volving the company's refusal to reinstate to employment an employee who had
settled a workmen's compensation claim against the company, based upon a per-
manent partial disability. The agreement reserved to management power to dis-
charge for cause, and also contained a provision that the employer will employ
employees on the principle of seniority "where ability and efficiency are equal."
33. United Steelworkers v. Am. Mfg. Co., 264 F.2d 624 (6th Cir. 1959).
34. Local 205, United Elec. Workers v. Gen. Elec. Co., 233 F.2d 85, 101
(1st Cir. 1956), aff'd, 353 U.S. 547 (1957).
35. New Bedford Defense Prod. Div. v. Local 1113, Int'l Union, UAW, 259
F.2d 522, 526-27 (lst Cir. 1958).
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the Sixth Circuit was relying only" on dicta 6 for its holding, not on
ideology. Only the Cutler-Hammer doctrine 37 stood in serious opposition
to the holding of the Supreme Court, and this doctrine the Court ex-
pressly rejected as being capable only of having "a crippling effect on
grievance arbitration.1
38
C.
Effect of Specific Exclusion From Arbitration.
In United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Nay. Co. the courts were
confronted with a collective bargaining agreement which excepted from
arbitration matters "which are strictly a function of management. '39
Under what is basically a normal arbitration clause 40 suit was brought to
enforce arbitration of a grievance protesting the company's contracting
out work, because this caused unemployment of a number of employees
due to lack of work, thus allegedly constituting a partial lockout in
violation of a "no lockout" provision. Citing the Magruder opinion in
Local 14941 and the Second Circuit's Eng'rs Ass'n case,42 the Court of
Appeals for the Fifth Circuit, with Judge Rives dissenting, affirmed the
district court's dismissal of the complaint, relying on the clause excluding
from arbitration matters "which are strictly a function of management,"
and on the "ample evidence" at trial level to the effect that the parties had
failed to agree to submit to arbitration the company's right to contract
out work. The dissenting opinion viewed the matter of sub-contracting as
not without restriction, though it be "strictly a function of management,"
but rather, limited by another section of the agreement, which "expressly
subordinates all management functions to the over-riding limitation that
they 'not be used for purposes of discrimination against any members of
the Union.'" Therefore, Judge Rives opined, since the union's grievance
was premised upon the theory that the employer had utilized the practice
of sub-contracting to discriminate against the members of the union,
arbitration of its grievance should be compelled.
36. United Steelworkers v. Am. Mfg. Co., 264 F.2d 624, 627 (6th Cir. 1959).
37. Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v. Cutler-Hammer, Inc., 271 App. Div. 917, 67
N.Y.S.2d 317 (1947), aftd, 297 N.Y. 519, 74 N.E.2d 464 (1947). In this case, the
New York Court of Appeals held that if the meaning of the provision of the contract
sought to be arbitrated is beyond dispute, there cannot be anything to arbitrate and
the contract cannot be said to provide for arbitration.
38. United Steelworkers v. Am. Mfg. Co., 80 Sup. Ct. 1343, 1346 (1960).
39. 80 Sup. Ct. 1347, 1349 (1960).
40. Id. at 1349. The Court considered the clause somewhat broader than
normal, since the grievance procedure would become applicable to handle "any local
trouble of any kind."
41. Local 149, Am. Fed'n of Technical Eng'rs v. Gen. Elec. Co., 250 F.2d 922(1st Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 938 (1958).
42. Eng'rs Ass'n v. Sperry Gyroscope, 251 F.2d 133 (2d Cir. 1957), cert. denied,
356 U.S. 932 (1958).
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The majority represents the Local 14943 point of view, for they
performed their inescapable duty of determining as a preliminary matter
whether defendant contracted to refer the grievance to arbitration, even
though such determination depended on the same facts relevant to a decision
by an arbitrator upon the merits of the grievance. The majority reasoned
that if the grievance constituted a matter which was not strictly a function
of management it would be subject to arbitration, but it was found that
the evidence clearly disclosed that the matter involved was considered by
the parties to be strictly a function of management. 44 On the other hand,
the dissent was representative of the Eng'rs Ass'n 45 theory in that it
decided that the grievance might be a utilization of the practice of sub-
contracting to discriminate against the members of the union, and as
such, would be arbitrable under another section of the contract. In addi-
tion, the moving party had produced evidence tending to establish its
claim. 46 The Court, while reversing the majority decision, was not con-
tent to adopt the dissenting view, but fashioned a much more liberal
set of rules geared to enhance the authority of the arbitrator. Pertinent
excerpts from the opinion, illustrating the Court's conception of the
federal substantive law, follow:
... judicial inquiry under § 301 must be strictly confined to the
question whether the reluctant party did agree to arbitrate the griev-
ance or agreed to give the arbitrator power to make the award he made.
An order to arbitrate the particular grievance should not be denied
unless it may be said with positive assurance that the arbitration
clause is not susceptible to an interpretation that covers the asserted
dispute. Doubts should be resolved in favor of coverage. (Emphasis
added.) 47
Apart from matters that the parties specifically exclude, all of the
questions on which the parties disagree must . . . come within the
scope of the grievance and arbitration provisions of the collective
agreement.... (Emphasis added. ) 48
... In the absence of any express provision excluding a particu-
lar grievance from arbitration, we think only the most forceful evi-
dence of a purpose to exclude the claim from arbitration can prevail,
particularly where . . . the exclusion clause is vague and the arbitra-
tion claiise quite broad. Since any attempt by a court to infer such a
43. Local 149, Am. Fed'n of Technical Eng'rs v. Gen. Elec. Co., 250 F.2d
922 (Ist Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 938 (1958).
44. United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Nav. Co., 269 F.2d 633, 636-37
(5th Cir. 1959).
45. Eng'rs Ass'n v. Sperry Gyroscope, 251 F.2d 133 (2d Cir. 1957), cert. denied,
356 U.S. 932 (1958).
46. United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Nay. Co., 269 F.2d 633, 640 n.8
(5th Cir. 1959).
47. United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Nay. Co., 80 Sup. Ct. 1347, 1353
(1960). This excerpt does no more than vary in degree the Eng'rs Ass'n doctrine,
but radical innovations are contained in the remaining excerpts.
48. Id. at 1352.
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purpose necessarily comprehends the merits, the court should view
with suspicion an attempt to persuade it to become entangled in the
construction of the substantive provisions of a labor agreement, even
through the back door of interpreting the arbitration clause, when
the alternative is to utilize the services of an arbitrator. (Emphasis
added.) 49
Mr. Justice Whittaker in a lone, but vigorous, dissent adopted the
lower court's decision and the Local 14950 doctrine, placing great emphasis
on the intent of the parties in agreeing to submit to arbitration. His
understanding of the "unquestioned law" is that the arbitrators' "power
to decide issues with finality, thus ousting the normal functions of the
courts, must rest upon a clear, definitive agreement of the parties, as such
powers can never be implied." 51 The lone dissenting voice agrees with
the majority that courts have no proper concern with the merits of claims
which by contract the parties have agreed to submit to the exclusive
jurisdiction of arbitrators. To ascertain what the parties have agreed to
submit to the exclusive jurisdiction of arbitrators, however, Justice-
Whittaker says the test is:
Did the parties in their contract "manifest by plain language" their
willingness to submit the issue in controversy to arbitrators? If they
did, then the arbitrators have exclusive jurisdiction of it, and the
courts, absent fraud or the like, must respect that exclusive juris-
diction and cannot interfere. But if they did not, then the courts
must exercise their jurisdiction, when properly invoked, to protect the
citizen against the attempted use by arbitrators of pretended powers
actually never conferred. That question always is, and from its very
nature must be a judicial one.52
D.
Enforcement of Arbitrator's Award.
The Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., case 53 involved a suit for en-
forcement of an arbitrator's award under a contract containing the normal
49. Id. at 1354.
50. Local 149, Am. Fed'n of Technical Eng'rs v. Gen. Elec. Co., 250 F.2d 922(lst Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 938 (1958).
51. United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Nay. Co., 80 Sup. Ct. 1347, 1354-55
(1960) (dissenting opinion).
52. Id. at 1358. Compare Independent Petroleum Workers v. Standard Oil
Co., 275 F.2d 706 (7th Cir. 1960); Local 1912, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v. United
States Potash Co., 270 F.2d 496 (10th Cir. 1959). The Courts of Appeal for the
Seventh and Tenth Circuits, while performing their traditional tasks of determining
arbitrability under the pertinent provisions of the contract, came to opposite con-
clusions on the question of whether sub-contracting of work by an employer is
arbitrable in the absence of express reference to sub-contracting, but the factual
situations were distinguishable, as is often the case when the intent of the parties
is in question.
53. United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 80 Sup. Ct. 1358
(1960).
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arbitration clause. Unjust discharge was an arbitrable issue, and the con-
tract provided that if an arbitrator found that an employee had been
unjustly discharged the company "shall reinstate the employee and pay
full compensation at the employee's regular rate of pay for the time lost."
The contract had expired on April 4, 1957 and, on April 10, 1958, the
arbitrator filed an award for the unjust discharge of several employees
prior to the expiration date of the contract, the award directing rein-
statement of the aggrieved employees with back pay. The Court of Appeals
for the Fourth Circuit modified the district court's direction to the em-
ployer to comply, holding that an award for reinstatement and for back
pay for the period subsequent to the date of termination of the collective
bargaining agreement could not be enforced. 54 The court reasoned that a
party suing for specific performance under section 301 is restricted by the
terms of the contract between the employer and the union.5 5 This con-
stitutes but an adaptation of the Local 14956 doctrine to the enforcement of
-awards. The United States Supreme Court, consistent with its liberal
viewpoint in Warrior & Gulf Nay. Co.,57 reversed the judgment of the
court of appeals, basing their decision on the following rationale:
An arbitrator's award is legitimate only so long as it draws its
essence from the collective bargaining agreement. When the arbitra-
tor's words manifest an infidelity to this obligation, courts have no
choice but to refuse enforcement of the award.
A mere ambiguity in the opinion accompanying an award,
which permits the inference that the arbitrator may have exceeded his
authority is not a reason for refusing to enforce an award. Arbitra-
tors have no obligation to the court to give their reasons for an
award. To require opinions free of ambiguity may lead arbitrators to
play it safe by writing no supporting opinions. This would be
undesirable for a well-reasoned opinion tends to engender confidence
in the integrity of the process and aids in clarifying the underlying
agreement. Moreover, we see no reason to assume that this arbitra-
tor has abused the trust the parties confided in him and has not
stayed within the area marked out for his consideration. It is not ap-
.parent that he went beyond the submission. ....
The collective bargaining agreement could have provided that
if any of the employees were wrongfully discharged, the remedy
wouldbe reinstatement and back pay up to the date they were re-
turned to work. . . . [I]nterpretation of the collective bargaining
agreement is a question for the arbitrators. It is the arbitrator's con-
struction which was bargained for; and so far as the arbitrator's
54. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp. v. United Steelworkers, 269 F.2d 327 (4th
Cir. 1959).
55. Id. at 330-31:
56. Local 149, Am. Fed'n of Technical Eng'rs v. Gen. Elec. Co., 250 F.2d 922
(1st Cir. 1957), cert, denied, 356 U.S. 938 (1958).
57. United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Nay. Co., 80 Sup. Ct. 1347 (1960).
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decision concerns construction of the contract, the courts have no
business overruling him because their interpretation of the contract is
different from his."
Again Justice Whittaker adopts the lower court's decision and the
Local 1491s doctrine, contending that the "sole question here is whether
the arbitrators exceeded the submission and their powers in awarding
reinstatement and back pay for any period after expiration of the col-
lective agreements,"80 and that the correct answer is that they did since
"I find nothing in the collective agreement that purports to so authorize. 1'
E.
Synopsis of the Rules of the Supreme Court Decisions.
The following are among the most significant principles laid down
by the Supreme Court in these three landmark decisions which so "vastly
enhance the authority and status of labor arbitrators and correspondingly
diminish the role of the courts in labor arbitration. ' 6 2
1. The courts have no business weighing the merits of a grievance
and even frivolous claims ar subject to arbitration. The Cutler-
Hammer doctrine 3 is specifically rejected as having a crippling effect
on grievance arbitration.
2. A grievance should not be excluded from arbitration by the
courts unless it can be said with positive assurance that the subject is
not arbitrable. Doubts should be resolved in favor of coverage.
3. In the absence of any express provision excluding a particular
grievance from arbitration, only the most forceful evidence of a
purpose to exclude the claim can prevail, particularly where the
exclusion clause is vague and the arbitration clause quite broad.
4. Courts should refuse enforcement of an arbitrator's award
when his words manifest an infidelity to his obligation. But it must
be apparent that he went beyond the authority granted to him.
As if by design the court relegated to a footnote 6 4 a colorable acknowl-
edgement of the traditional rule that the question of arbitrability of a
grievance is for the courts, not the arbitrators, to decide, and when it is
58. United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 80 Sup. Ct. 1358,
1361-62 (1960). (Emphasis added.)
59. Local 149, Am. Fed'n of Technical Eng'rs v. Gen. Elec. Co., 250 F.2d 922(1st Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 938 (1958).
60. United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 80 Sup. Ct. 1358, 1363(1960) (dissenting opinion).
61. Ibid.
62. 15 ARn. J. 114 (1960).
63. Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v. Cutler-Hammer, Inc., 271 App. Div. 917, 67
N.Y.S.2d 317 (1947), aff'd, 297 N.Y. 519, 74 N.E.2d 464 (1947).
64. United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Nav. Co., 80 Sup. Ct. 1347, 1353
n.7 (1960).
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claimed that an arbitrator rather than a court should resolve such a
question, the claimant must bear the burden of a clear demonstration of
the purpose.
IV.
CONCLUSION.
The conflict which the Supreme Court faced and resolved in the
Warrior & Gulf Nay. Co.65 and the Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp.66
cases is one between the congressional policy in favor of settlement of
disputes through the machinery of arbitration and regard for the intent
of the parties not to submit a dispute to arbitration, 7 between those who
advocate judicial abnegation 8 and those who would preserve the traditional
function of the court by seeking the intent of the parties to the agree-
ment.6 9 This latter point of view is probably motivated much less by a
jealous eye, scanning the arbitration device lest it infringe upon or oust
the courts from their historic role,70 than by a sense of obligation to the
parties involved 7 1 and to the historical principles of Anglo-American
law.7 2 A firm advocate of the latter point of view, yet appreciative of
the opposing viewpoint, Judge Magruder urged that judicial abnegation
and the enhancement of the arbitrator's authority should be achieved
through a voluntary submission of the threshold question of arbitrability
to the arbitrator. 73 It is submitted that this would have been a more proper
course to follow than that chosen by the Supreme Court; that the terms
of an arbitration agreemet should be resolved at the bargaining table
and should not be imposed by judicial legislation. The Court of Appeals
for the Fifth Circuit rested its decision in the Warrior & Gulf Nay. Co.
case 74 in part on the theory that it would be unconscionable to find
arbitrable an issue which the union at the conference table was unable to
65. Supra note 64.
66. United Steelworkers v. Enterprise Wheel & Car Corp., 80 Sup. Ct. 1358(1960).
67. United Steelworkers of America v. Warrior & Gulf Nay. Co., 80 Sup. Ct.
1347, 1353 (1960).
68. Cox, Reflections Upon Labor Arbitration, 72 HARV. L. Riv. 1482, 1483
(1959) ; Shulman, Reason, Contracts, and Law in Labor Relations, 68 HARV. L. Ri1v.
999, 1024 (1955); Wellington, Judge Magruder and the Labor Contract, 72 HARV.
L. Rtv. 1268, 1299 (1959).
69. See Local 1912, Int'l Ass'n of Machinists v. United States Potash Co., 270
F.2d 496, 498 (10th Cir. 1959); Local 149, Am. Fed'n of Technical Eng'rs v. Gen.
Elec. Co., 250 F.2d 922, 927 (1st Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 938 (1958);
Jalet, Judicial Review of Arbitration: The Judicial Attitude, 45 CORNIeLL L.Q. 519,
549 (1960).
70. Refining Employees Union v. Continental Oil Co., 268 F.2d 447, 460 (5th
Cir. 1959) (dissenting opinion).
71. Local 149, American Fed'n of Technical Eng'rs v. Gen. Elec. Co., 250
F.2d 922 (1st Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 938 (1958).
72. Refinery Employees Union v. Continental Oil Co., 268 F.2d 447, 460 (5th
Cir. 1959) (concurring opinion).
73. Local 149, American Fed'n of Technical Eng'rs v. Gen. Elec. Co., 250 F.2d
922 (1st Cir. 1957), cert. denied, 356 U.S. 938 (1958).
74. United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Nav. Co., 269 F.2d 633 (5th Cir.
1959).
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obtain the employer's consent to include within the arbitration clause.75
The intent of many employers will be frustrated, employers who, like Mr.
Justice Whittaker, understood at the time of contracting that the authority
of the arbitrator was dependent upon proof by the moving party that the
grievance is included within the scope of the agreement. Today, under
the normal arbitration clause, these employers find that the party re-
luctant to arbitrate must show, either by an express provision or by the
most forceful evidence, that it was the purpose of the parties to exclude
this matter from arbitration.
Expressions of disapproval notwithstanding, the Law of the Land
has been established in this particular area. But it is submitted that the
'idea of court ascertainment of the parties' intention has not yet earned a
decent interment, as its opponents might hopefully think.76 The United
States Supreme Court has found in other areas 77 that tradition is not so
shallow as to be uprooted by one of its decisions. It is submitted that
the traditionalists will find ingenious distinctions by which they will
whittle away at principles that frustrate the intent of the parties.78 Mean-
while employers, now wary of arbitration clauses in that they are sus-
ceptible to judicially added terms, will learn to fashion arbitration provi-
sions which will abound in exclusion clauses.
L. Francis Murphy*
75. Id. at 636-37.
76. Refinery Employees Union v. Continental Oil Co., 268 F.2d 447, 460 (5th
Cir. 1959) (dissenting opinion).
77. See, e.g., Shuttlesworth v. Birmingham Bd. of Educ., 162 F. Supp. 372
(N.D. Ala. 1958), aff'd per curiam, 358 U.S. 101 (1958).
78. See United Steelworkers v. Warrior & Gulf Nav. Co., 363 U.S. 574, 80 Sup.
Ct. 1347, 1354 (1960) (dissenting opinion). With the emphasis that Mr. Justice
Whittaker gives to the -nineteen years of union acquiescence in the employer's in-
terpretation that contracting out work is "strictly a function of management," it is
readily conceivable that such a factor could be held to constitute "the most forceful
evidence of a purpose to exclude."
* Aided in research by Arthur T. Downey.
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